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HEMPEL’S RAVEN PARADOX:
A LACUNA IN THE STANDARD BAYESIAN SOLUTION










“What do you like best about philosophy?” my grandmother asks. “Every philosopher is brilliant!” I unhesitatingly reply. “That’s hardly believable” my grandmother responds. To convince her I perform an experiment. I choose randomly a person, Rex, from the telephone directory. Predictably enough, Rex is neither brilliant nor a philosopher. “You see,” I crow, “this confirms my claim that every philosopher is brilliant!” My grandmother is unimpressed.

I repeat the experiment: I choose randomly another person, Kurt. Surprisingly, Kurt is both a philosopher and brilliant. Now my grandmother is really impressed. “Look, grandma,” I patiently explain, “you are being irrational. The fact that Kurt is both a philosopher and brilliant confirms the hypothesis that every philosopher is brilliant—or so you accept. But then the fact that Rex is both nonbrilliant and a nonphilosopher confirms the hypothesis that everything nonbrilliant is a nonphilosopher, and thus also confirms the logically equivalent hypothesis that every philosopher is brilliant—or so you should accept.”

“Young man, you are being impertinent” my grandmother retorts. “You just rehearsed Hempel’s paradox; I do remember my philosophy classes. But it’s called a ‘paradox’ precisely because its conclusion is absurd.”

“Is it, though?” I shamefacedly reply. “Not according to Bayesians. They argue that the fact that Rex is neither brilliant nor a philosopher does confirm the hypothesis that every philosopher is brilliant—although only to a minute degree, this is why we have the illusion that it doesn’t confirm it at all.”

“Young man, you are being superficial” my grandmother responds. “Go through the Bayesian argument. It relies on the assumption that the fact that Rex is not brilliant should not affect the probability of the hypothesis that every philosopher is brilliant. What on earth justifies this assumption?”

I’m dumbfounded. What, indeed? Apparently nothing that the Bayesians themselves have said: the assumption in question is almost never explicitly defended in the literature. After some serious thought, I conclude that my grandmother is right: the assumption is implausible. The standard Bayesian solution to Hempel’s paradox has a lacuna.

In §2 I formulate more carefully Hempel’s paradox, the standard Bayesian solution, and the disputed assumption. In §3 and §4 I examine respectively arguments for and against the assumption. In §5 I propose a way out for the Bayesians. I conclude in §6.

2. Hempel’s paradox, the standard Bayesian solution, and the disputed assumption.

Hempel’s paradox can be formulated as the argument from NC and EC to PC:​[2]​

Nicod’s Condition (NC):	For any object x and any properties F and G, the proposition that x has both F and G confirms the proposition that every F has G.​[3]​
Equivalence Condition (EC):	For any propositions P, Q, and Q, if P confirms Q and Q is logically equivalent to Q, then P confirms Q.​[4]​
Paradoxical Conclusion (PC):	The proposition (E) that a is both nonblack and a nonraven confirms the proposition (H) that every raven is black.​[5]​

The argument is valid: the proposition that a is both nonblack and a nonraven confirms (by NC) the proposition that everything nonblack is a nonraven, and thus confirms (by EC) the logically equivalent proposition that every raven is black.​[6]​

The standard Bayesian solution to the paradox tries to vindicate PC. Bayesians argue that E does confirm H—but only to a minute degree, given that there are overwhelmingly more nonblack objects than there are ravens. Bayesians also claim that PC looks unacceptable (i.e., we have the impression that E does not confirm H at all) because we implicitly realize that the degree to which E confirms H is for all practical purposes negligible (and is much smaller than the degree to which the proposition that a is both black and a raven confirms H).​[7]​

More formally, let R, , B, and  be respectively the properties of being a raven, a nonraven, black, and nonblack; then E   Let the degree to which E confirms H be P(H|E) – P(H),​[8]​ P being a subjective probability measure. It can be shown that:
(1)  ​[9]​
If it is part of the background knowledge that a is drawn randomly from a population containing overwhelmingly more nonblack objects than ravens, then  is minute​[10]​—and thus so is  which is by definition  and thus does not exceed P(Ra) / It follows that  namely  is very close to 1; say it’s 1–2 (with  minute) and substitute in (1).

Bayesians standardly assume that P(Ba|H) and P(Ba) should be equal; this is the disputed assumption. Equivalently,  and  (and thus also  and P(H)) should be equal. Then (1) gives that P(H|E) – P(H) should be P(H)[(1–2)–1–1], namely P(H)2/(1–2); this is both positive​[11]​ and minute, just as the Bayesians claim. It follows that the disputed assumption is sufficient for the Bayesian claim that E confirms H to a minute degree. To my knowledge, however, it has escaped notice that the assumption is also approximately necessary for the Bayesian claim. (1) entails that P(H|E) – P(H) is positive exactly if  > 1–2, and is minute—say less than 2—exactly if  < (1–2)[1+(2/P(H))]. Assuming that P(H) is not much more minute than 2, it follows that P(H|E) – P(H) is both positive and minute exactly if  is very close to 1; equivalently, P(Ba|H)  P(Ba). I conclude that for all practical purposes the disputed assumption is necessary for the standard Bayesian solution to work.​[12]​

3. Attempts to defend the disputed assumption.​[13]​

Despite being essential for the standard Bayesian solution, the disputed assumption is almost never explicitly defended in the literature.​[14]​ The only argument that I have encountered in support of the assumption was adduced by Woodward: “in the absence of some special reason for supposing otherwise, it seems reasonable that my estimate of the number of masses in the universe should not go down (or up) when I learn that they all obey the inverse square law” (1985: 415). More formally, let P and P+ be respectively my subjective probability measures right before and right after I learn that H is true. Woodward’s argument might be formalized as follows: (1) P+(Ba) and P(Ba) should be equal; (2) P+(Ba) and P(Ba|H) should be equal; thus (3) P(Ba|H) and P(Ba) should be equal. How convincing, however, is premise (1)? One person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens: granting (2), someone who denies (3) will find (1) implausible. In other words, if my prior probability measure P is (rationally) such that P(Ba|H) and P(Ba) differ, then (given (2)) P+(Ba) and P(Ba) should differ—my estimate of the percentage of black objects should go up or down when I learn that they include every raven. Of course for all I said it may still be the case that it’s epistemically irrational to have a prior which violates (3); my present point is only that Woodward’s argument doesn’t show this to be the case.

Another attempt—this one not in the literature—to defend the disputed assumption appeals to the following Principle of Conditional Indifference (PCI): if none of H1, H2 gives more reason than the other to believe E, then P(E|H1) and P(E|H2) should be equal. Whether or not every raven is black seems irrelevant to whether the (randomly selected) object a is black, so PCI gives that P(Ba|H) and P(Ba|H) should be equal; this is equivalent to the disputed assumption.​[15]​ PCI, however, bears a suspicious resemblance to the notorious Principle of Indifference (PI): if E gives no more reason to believe one of H1, H2 rather than the other, then P(H1|E) and P(H2|E) should be equal. PI is well known to “yield inconsistencies with alarming ease” (Howson & Urbach 1993: 59), but one might argue that PCI does not do so. PI yields an inconsistency if it is applied to two partitions of logical space, {H1, …, Hn} and {H1, …, Hm}, which have different numbers of members (n  m) but share a member—say H1 = H1. Indeed, PI in such a case entails that P(H1|E) should be equal to both 1/n and 1/m. PCI, by contrast, in such a case entails that P(E|H1) should be equal to P(E),​[16]​ a value independent of the partition. Nevertheless, in the Appendix I argue that PCI does lead to inconsistency in the context of the disputed assumption. So this attempt to defend the assumption by using indifference fails.

There is a general reason why the disputed assumption is hard to defend. Suppose one somehow refutes the claim that my estimate of the percentage of black objects should go up or down when I learn that they include every raven. The disputed assumption does not follow: it does not follow that my estimate should remain the same. What follows instead is that my estimate may remain the same. Indeed: denying that my estimate should go up or down is compatible with affirming that it may go up or down and thus does not entail that it should remain the same. So even if there is no reason why P(Ba|H) and P(Ba) should differ, maybe there is no reason why they should be equal either: maybe they may differ and they may also be equal. But why understand the disputed assumption as the claim that P(Ba|H) and P(Ba) should be—rather than may be or are—equal? Because the assumption is used to defend the claim that E confirms H, and this is most reasonably understood as the claim that P(H|E) should exceed P(H); as Horwich (1982: 52) puts it, “reason requires” that P(H|E) exceed P(H).​[17]​ I conclude that the disputed assumption makes a relatively strong claim (“should” rather than “may”) and is for that reason hard to defend. In any case, it seems that no adequate defense of the assumption exists.

4. Attempts to refute the disputed assumption.

Opponents of the disputed assumption have been more diligent than proponents: I have found in the literature three attempts to refute the assumption. I will argue, however, that all three attempts fail.

An indirect attempt to refute the disputed assumption was made by Horwich (1982: 58-9). He argued that the assumption has the counterintuitive consequence that H is slightly disconfirmed by the proposition that a is both black and a nonraven.​[18]​ This consequence was called “awkward” by Swinburne (1971: 324, 1973: 158), “a minor embarrassment” by Horwich (1982: 58), “unintuitive” by Maher (1999: 61), “a paradox” by Hooker and Stove (1967: 307), “unacceptable” by Pennock (1991: 66 n. 21), and “a debilitating weakness” by Rody (1978: 289). I don’t see, however, why Bayesians should be embarrassed. To the charge that on their account  confirms H, Bayesians reply that the degree of confirmation is minute. Similarly, to the charge that on their account  disconfirms H, Bayesians can reply that the degree of disconfirmation is minute.​[19]​ If one accepts the first reply, then why reject the second?​[20]​

Another attempt to refute the disputed assumption was made by Swinburne: “But now h, ‘all ’s are ’ is added to our evidence. This is going to lead us to suppose that there are more ’s and less ’s than, without it, we had supposed” (1971: 325). This argument is analogous to Woodward’s (see §3) and might be similarly formalized: (1) P+(Ba) should exceed P(Ba); (2) P+(Ba) and P(Ba|H) should be equal; thus (3) P(Ba|H) should exceed P(Ba). I reply again that one person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens: if my prior probability measure P is (rationally) such that P(Ba|H) and P(Ba) are equal, then (given (2)) P+(Ba) and P(Ba) should be equal. Again, for all I said it may still be the case that it’s epistemically irrational to have a prior which violates (3), but my present point is only that Swinburne’s argument doesn’t show this to be the case.​[21]​

A third attempt to refute the disputed assumption was made by Maher: “There are just two ways   can be true,” namely  and  and H rules out  “since [H] does not rule out any of the ways in which a can be black, it is plausible that”  should exceed  (1999: 60). Maher’s conclusion is equivalent to the claim that  should exceed  which is in turn equivalent to the claim that  +  should exceed  +  Maher points out that  should be zero. Does then Maher’s argument amount to no more than the (clearly unwarranted) assertion that, because the former of the last two sums has two potentially positive terms but the latter has just one, the former should exceed the latter? Maher might note in response that the only potentially positive term in the latter sum, namely  “corresponds” to one of the terms in the former sum, namely  But how would this correspondence help Maher’s argument, unless he assumed that the corresponding terms should be equal? And clearly he would not be entitled to make this assumption (I am not saying he does make it), which is equivalent to the claim that  and P(H) should be equal: this would beg the question against the Bayesians, who claim that  does confirm H. I conclude that Maher’s argument fails.​[22]​

Where does this leave us? I think that Swinburne’s and Maher’s arguments were bound to fail because they tried to show too much, namely that P(Ba|H) and P(Ba) should differ.​[23]​ To refute the disputed assumption it’s enough to show instead that these two quantities may differ, and to show this one could try to rebut every putative reason why they should be equal. In §3 I rebutted the only two such reasons of which I am aware. Although the disputed assumption is thereby made implausible, it is clearly not decisively refuted. Still, until further reasons are adduced, it seems sensible for those Bayesians who rely on the assumption to look for a way to stop relying on it.

5. A way out for the Bayesians.

It is important to distinguish two questions that a full solution to Hempel’s paradox must address:

Prescriptive question:	Should  exceed P(H) (i.e., does  confirm H)?
Explanatory question:	Why do people believe that  and P(H) should be equal (i.e., that  is confirmationally irrelevant to H)?

The standard Bayesian solution answers the prescriptive question with “yes, but marginally”, and answers the explanatory question with the claim that people mistake marginal confirmation for confirmational irrelevance. If the disputed assumption is false, then the Bayesians must give up the above answer to the prescriptive question:  may be equal to or different from P(H), and which of these cases should hold depends (approximately) on whether P(Ba|H) is equal to or different from P(Ba).​[24]​ But the Bayesians can still produce a plausible answer to the explanatory question: they can supplement their previous answer to this question with the claim that people mistakenly take the disputed assumption to be true. Why do people make this mistake? Because, I suggest, they reason by indifference (see §3). Take a standard example (van Fraassen 1989: 303): given that a cube comes from a factory which produces cubes with edge length at most 2 cm, what is the probability that the cube has edge length at most 1 cm? Most people, I conjecture, would say it’s 1/2. Similarly, I conjecture, most people would say that P(Ba|H) and P(Ba) should be equal. Reasoning by indifference comes naturally to people; it takes some thought to realize that such reasoning leads to inconsistencies.​[25]​






The disputed assumption, namely the claim that P(Ba|H) and P(Ba) should be equal, is both sufficient and approximately necessary for the standard Bayesian claim that – P(H) should be positive but minute; i.e., the claim that  does confirm H but only marginally. I argued that the assumption is implausible: P(Ba|H) and P(Ba) need not be equal. This is not to say that they should differ: they may differ but they may also be equal. If so, then the standard Bayesian answer to the prescriptive question must be given up:  and P(H) may differ but they may also be equal. The Bayesians, however, can still produce a plausible answer to the explanatory question: people, reasoning by indifference, mistakenly take the disputed assumption to be true, and then mistake marginal confirmation for confirmational indifference. I conclude that, even if the assumption is false, there is still hope for the Bayesians.

Appendix: The Principle of Conditional Indifference leads to inconsistency.

Suppose that an object a is drawn by simple random sampling from a finite population. Let the random variables X, Y, and Z represent respectively the percentages of ravens, of black objects, and of black ravens in the population (so that the percentage of ravens that are black is G = Z/X). Define the (Bernoulli) random variable R to have the value 1 if a is a raven and 0 otherwise. Then P(R=1|X=x) should be x. Given that the population contains overwhelmingly more nonblack objects than ravens, the space of all possible values for <X, Y, Z> is S = {<x, y, z>: 0  z  x  2(1–y)  2  z  y}, with 2 minute (ignoring, to simplify, the complication that x, y, and z can take only discrete values). To simplify the exposition, I will deal with the intersection S of S with the plane (e.g.) y = 1/2. S corresponds to the largest triangular area in Figure 1, the hypotenuse corresponding to H.

The key to generating an inconsistency by means of PCI is that a sample space can be partitioned in multiple ways. The family of lines {z = gx; 0  g  1} gives one partition of S; the family of lines {z = xn; n  1} (plus the line z = 0) gives another partition. (Strictly speaking, these are not partitions, because every line includes the point <0, 0>; but PCI is not limited to partitions.) Since a given value g of G is compatible with all possible values x of X, g provides no information on the distribution of R (which is determined by x); so PCI entails that, for any g and g, P(R=1|G=g) and P(R=1|G=g) should be equal to each other—and thus also to P(R=1). It follows that R and G = f1(X, Z) = Z/X should be independent. Similarly, PCI entails that R and N = f2(X, Z) = lnZ/lnX (this comes from Z = XN) should be independent. In the end, PCI will entail that R and <X, Z> should be independent, a conclusion incompatible with the claim that P(R=1|X=x) should be x.
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^2	  The exact origin of Hempel’s paradox is shrouded in mystery. Although Hempel apparently did not formulate the paradox in print until 1943 (128), Hosiasson-Lindenbaum formulated it as early as 1940 (136); she attributed it to Hempel but gave no reference. (Hempel (1945: 21 n. 2) referred to “discussions” with her.) The paradox was “foreshadowed” (Jeffrey 1995: 3) but by no means formulated by Hempel in 1937 (222).
^3	  NC is part of Nicod’s (1924: 23, 1930: 219) criterion of confirmation, which also includes (inter alia) a claim that entails the negation of PC: the proposition that x has neither F nor G does not confirm the proposition that every F has G. Some authors include that claim (or directly the negation of PC) in the premises of Hempel’s paradox; they formulate thus the paradox as an apparently inconsistent set of plausible premises rather than (as I do) as an apparently sound argument with an apparently unacceptable conclusion.
^4	  Some authors reject or modify EC. On the relevant debate see: Black 1966: 186; Fisch 1984; Foster 1971: 107-10; Giere 1970: 359, 361; Goodman 1983: 70-1; Grandy 1967: 22-3; Hempel 1945: 12-3; Lipton 1991: 102-3, 105; Morgenbesser 1962; Rody 1978: 298-300; Scheffler 1963: 286-91; Scheffler & Goodman 1972: 80-2; Schoenberg 1964: 202-8; Schwartz 1972: 247-8; Skyrms 1966: 242-3; Smokler 1967; Swinburne 1971: 320-1; Tempelmeier 1972: 10-1; Tuske 1998: 391, 399-400; Vincent 1975: 1-18; Young 1975: 56-60.
^5	  People sometimes speak as if it were a itself (the object) that supposedly confirms H. As Hempel notes, however, “[a] particular bird may be a crow and black, but may also have an albino crow for a sister; in virtue of these properties, it would both confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis ‘All crows are black’. This consideration suggests that an object can be said to confirm or to disconfirm a hypothesis only under a particular description” (1967: 239; cf. Stove 1966: 446). People also sometimes say that, because (e.g.) a green leaf is a nonblack nonraven, H is confirmed (according to a variant of Hempel’s paradox) by the proposition that a is a green leaf. Apparently they presuppose that, if P confirms Q and P entails P, then P confirms Q. But then H would be both confirmed and disconfirmed by the proposition that a is a green leaf and b is a nonblack raven (Stillwell 1985; Stove 1966).
^6	  In nomological versions of Hempel’s paradox, in which the sentences “every raven is black” and “everything nonblack is a nonraven” are used to express putative laws (rather than, e.g., accidental generalizations), one might deny that these sentences express logically equivalent propositions. On the relevant debate see: Black 1966: 186-7; Cohen 1987: 158-60; Gaifman 1979: 115; Harré 1970: 120-1; Hempel 1945: 15-8; Huggett 1960; Nerlich 1964; Skyrms 1966: 452; Stove 1966: 452; Swinburne 1971: 318-20; von Wright 1966: 217-8; Wilson 1964a, 1964b: 400-1; Young 1975: 55-6.
^7	  I refer to the standard Bayesian solution because “there is no such thing as the Bayesian solution. There are many different ‘solutions’ that Bayesians have put forward using Bayesian techniques” (Chihara 1981: 448). See, e.g.: Alexander 1958: 230-3; Chihara 1981: 440-8; Earman 1992: 69-73; Eells 1982: 60-1; Gaifman 1979; Gibson 1969; Good 1960, 1961; Hesse 1974: 155-62; Hooker & Stove 1967; Horwich 1982: 54-63; Hosiasson-Lindenbaum 1940: 136-41; Howson & Urbach 1993: 126-130; Jardine 1965; Mackie 1963: 266-9; Nerlich 1964; Suppes 1966; Swinburne 1971: 322-7, 1973: chap. 10; Wilson 1964b: 396-9; Woodward 1985: 409-16. Cf. Hintikka 1969; Humburg 1986; Maher 1999.
^8	  This is not the only measure of degree of confirmation that Bayesians have used (Fitelson 1999, 2001), but it can be shown that the results of this section also hold for, e.g., the ratio measure P(H|E)/P(H) and the likelihood-ratio measure 
^9	  Proof. By Bayes’ theorem, P(H|E) = P(E|H)P(H) / P(E). Now P(E) =  and P(E|H) =  because  = 1. So P(H|E) =  /   and (1) quickly follows. 
^10	  For the sake of simplicity I don’t consider cases in which a is drawn from a population of (e.g.) only ravens or only nonblack objects (cf.: Black 1966: 184; Horwich 1982: 58; Jardine 1965: 361-3; Royall 1997: 177-9; Woodward 1985: 411). For random sampling to be possible, assume that the population is finite. The inference to minuteness requires that P satisfies something like David Lewis’s “Principal Principle” (1986).
^11	  Assuming 0 < P(H) < 1. It can be shown that P(H) < 1 is both sufficient—if P(Ra|H) > 0—and necessary for  > 0.
^12	  Bayesians also standardly assume that P(Ra|H) and P(Ra) should be equal. This assumption is sufficient but not necessary for the claim that BaRa confirms H (what’s necessary is the claim that P(Ra|H)/P(Ra) should exceed P(Ba|Ra)). Strictly speaking it’s this assumption that some of the authors I engage in the sequel in fact discuss.
^13	  One might argue that the disputed assumption is trivially true: the percentage of black objects in the population is fixed and thus cannot depend on H. But one might equally well (or rather equally badly) argue that the percentage of ravens that are black is fixed and thus cannot depend on H! These percentages are fixed but unknown; as far as our state of knowledge is concerned, the situation is as if the population had been drawn from a set of possible populations, and the percentage of black objects does vary across this set.
^14	  Gaifman claims that, “not having ... a background theory, given only a natural classification into A’s and non-A’s and into B’s and non-B’s, there is no way in which knowing A’s frequency can be relevant to estimating B’s frequency within A” (1979: 126). Howson and Urbach comment that the assumption “seems plausible to us, at any rate as a good approximation” (1993: 127). That’s about all the “defense” of the assumption that I have found in the literature.
^15	  Proof. P(Ba|H) = P(Ba)  P(Ba|H) = P(Ba|H)P(H)+P(Ba|H)P(H)  P(Ba|H)[1–P(H)] = P(Ba|H)P(H)  P(Ba|H) = P(Ba|H)—assuming P(H) < 1. 
^16	  Proof. P(E) = P(E|H1)P(H1)+…+P(E|Hn)P(Hn) = P(E|H1)[P(H1)+…+P(Hn)] = P(E|H1). 
^17	  As Woodward (1985: 412-3) notes, this understanding of confirmation has the consequence that when E neither confirms nor disconfirms H it doesn’t follow that E is epistemically irrelevant to H (i.e., that P(H|E) and P(H) should be equal). But I take it that’s unavoidable: replacing “should exceed” with “exceeds” would make confirmation “too subjective” (Horwich 1982: 51).
^18	  Horwich (1982: 58-9), like Kruse (2000), also claims that the disputed assumption has the consequence that Bayesians are unable to distinguish cases in which a is drawn from different populations (see footnote 10). This is not so, but I don’t have the space to elaborate.
^19	  Proof.  = P(H) /  = [P(Ba|H) – P(BaRa|H)]P(H) /  = [P(Ba|H) –P(Ba|RaH)P(Ra|H)]P(H) /  = [P(Ba|H) – P(Ra|H)]P(H) /  = [P(Ba) – P(Ra)]P(H) /  if P(Ba|H) = P(Ba) and (see footnote 12) P(Ra|H) = P(Ra). So  – P(H)] / P(H) = P(Ba) – P(Ra)
– = P(BaRa) – P(Ra) =  < 0. Thus  – P(H) = –P(H) /  = 
–P(H) / [P(Ba) – P(BaRa)] = –P(H) / [P(Ba)(1–P(Ra|Ba))], which is minute if the background knowledge ensures that  and P(Ra|Ba) are minute but P(Ba) /  is not (there are overwhelmingly more nonblack objects and more black objects than ravens, but not overwhelmingly more nonblack than black objects). 
^20	  Of course some people reject the first reply. On the relevant debate see: Aronson 1989: 232; Black 1966: 196; Chihara 1981: 442; Cohen 1987: 154; Hempel 1965: 48; Hintikka 1969: 27; Poundstone 1988: 39.
^21	  Swinburne tries to bolster his argument as follows: “If all future ’s are , then in so far as ’s are similar to ~’s, future ~’s are more likely to be  than we would otherwise have supposed” (1971: 325; cf. Maher 2002: 7). But why suppose that ’s are similar to ~’s?
^22	  Maher also argues (1999: 60) that the disputed assumption is incompatible with imposing five conditions on P (including Carnap’s “λ-condition”). Maher, however, admits he “cannot prove” (1999: 53) that these conditions hold in the context of Hempel’s paradox.
^23	  Forster (1994: 362-3), following Good (1967: 322), argues that P(Ra|H) and P(Ra) should differ in the presence of appropriate background knowledge; but it does not follow that they should differ in the absence of such knowledge. Cf.: Aronson 1989: 231-7; Chihara 1981: 431-2, 451 n. 35; Earman 1992: 70; Good 1968; Hempel 1967; Horwich 1982: 62; Howson & Urbach 1993: 128-9; Korb 1994; Maher 1999: 62-4; Poundstone 1988: 39-40; Rosenkrantz 1977: 33-5, 1982: 82-4; Sainsbury 1988: 82; Swinburne 1971: 326-7; Will 1966: 56-7.
^24	  If so, and if the Equivalence Condition is true, then the Bayesians must also give up Nicod’s condition.
^25	  To reach an inconsistency in the factory example, note that the factory produces cubes of volume at most 8 cm3, and we are asking what is the probability that a cube from the factory has volume at most 1 cm3; so why shouldn’t the answer be 1/8 rather than 1/2? To reach an inconsistency in the context of the disputed assumption, see the Appendix.
